Report to the President

Official link

31 March 2005

US intelligence on Iraq chaotic and incompetent, says Bush commission

01 April 2005

By Julian Borger

The birth of Iraq's deadly insurgency

June 26, 2005

Discusses the numerous mistakes in setting up an Iraqi democracy,

a process characterized by mismanagement and remarkable hubris.

State of War: The Secret History of the C.I.A. and the Bush Administration

"With relentless media coverage, breathtaking events, and extraordinary congressional and

independent investigations, it is hard to believe that we still might not know some of the

most significant facts about the presidency of George W. Bush. Yet beneath the surface events

of the Bush presidency lies a secret history -- a series of hidden events that makes a mockery

of current debate.

"This hidden history involves domestic spying, abuses of power, and outrageous operations. It

includes a CIA that became caught in a political cross fire that it could not withstand, and what

it did to respond. It includes a Defense Department that made its own foreign policy, even

against the wishes of the commander in chief. It features a president who created a sphere of

deniability in which his top aides were briefed on matters of the utmost sensitivity -- but the

president was carefully kept in ignorance. State of War reveals this hidden history for the first

time, including scandals that will redefine the Bush presidency."

Prewar Findings Worried Analysts

"On Jan. 24, 2003, four days before President Bush delivered his State of the Union address

presenting the case for war against Iraq, the National Security Council staff put out a call

for new intelligence to bolster claims that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons or programs.

"The person receiving the request, Robert Walpole, then the national intelligence officer for

strategic and nuclear programs, would later tell investigators that "the NSC believed the

nuclear case was weak," according to a 500-page report released last year by the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence."

 Prewar CIA report doubted claim that al Qaeda sought WMD in Iraq

This likely refers to the FromYear2003 Iraqi Support for Terrorism report, which was apparently referencing

al-Libi's testimony.

    "In February 2002, al-Libi, a senior military trainer for al Qaeda in Afghanistan, claimed the

terrorist network "sent operatives to Iraq" to acquire weapons. His claim was reported in a CIA

paper seven months later entitled, "Iraqi Support for Terrorism."

    "The January 2003 updated version of the report added a key point: 'That the detainee was not

in a position to know if any training had taken place.' "

Official: U.S. calls off search for Iraqi WMDs

"In October, Duelfer released a preliminary report finding that in March 2003 -- the month of the

invasion -- Saddam did not have any WMD stockpiles and had not started any program to produce them.

The Iraq Survey Group report said that Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and

Saddam ended the country's nuclear program after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

The report found that Iraq worked hard to cheat on United Nations-imposed sanctions and retain the

capability to resume production of weapons of mass destruction at some time in the future.

"Saddam wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of

mass destruction when sanctions were lifted," a summary of the report said.

After Duelfer delivered his Iraq Survey Group's report to the Senate, Bush acknowledged that Iraq

didn't have weapons of mass destruction at the time he ordered the invasion but said Saddam was

"systematically gaming the system" and that the world is safer because he is no longer in power."

Al-Libi’s Tall Tales

10 November 2005

The Left Coaster

23 November 2005

Excellent series detailing various intelligence claims.